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Abstract 
In this response to Ribeiro and Lima’s paper on interactional expertise we argue that, by not 
incorporating the insights of constructivist social science, their analysis goes backwards 
rather than advancing the debate. We show that much of the evidence they present as 
antagonistic to the concept supports it. We also critically examine the idea of physical 
contiguity, which forms a central part of Ribeiro and Lima’s position.  We show that its 
meaning is ambiguous. We conclude by suggesting that more research on the nature and 
influence of physical contiguity would be interesting in its own right but that it would not 
bear on the notion of interactional expertise. 
Keywords 
interactional expertise, physical contiguity, embodiment 
 
Correspondence: 
Harry Collins, SOCSI, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF10 3WT, UK 
Email: CollinsHM@cf.ac.uk  
 Critique in context 
It is gratifying when a new concept is widely discussed and criticized. It shows that, even if 
not everyone is completely happy with the concept, it is making an impact. Also, it is only 
through the to-and-fro of debate that a concept can become fully worked out and refined. In 
the case of interactional expertise (IE), this process is already happening. As Ribeiro and 
Lima (2016) note, two other recent critiques of IE – Plaisance and Kennedy (2014) and 
Goddiksen (2014) – call for an extension of the concept, both to make it more inclusive, and 
also to increase the number of people who could claim to be interactional experts. In contrast, 
Ribeiro and Lima (hereafter R&L) either want to dismiss the idea of IE as empirically 
unsupportable, or to claim that all deep understanding must be based on practice.  
The timing of R&L’s critique is somewhat unfortunate. We replied to Plaisance and Kennedy 
and to Goddiksen, in two long analyses that bear directly on issues raised by R&L. The first 
analysis was of the concept of IE (Collins and Evans, 2015), and the second was of the 
concept of contributory expertise (Collins et al., 2015). In addition, there is a third recent 
paper by one of us (Collins, 2016), the second half of which is directed specifically at the 
embodiment thesis and its relationship to the idea of IE. Of course, R&L had no direct access 
to these papers when writing their own, but Ribeiro was present at several conferences where 
the ideas from all three of the papers were presented. 
Instead of working through R&L’s paper line-by-line and providing links to the relevant parts 
of our responses elsewhere, we will use this opportunity to do two things: first, we will try to 
clear up some of the more important misunderstandings, in the hope that future discussions 
can be built on a more secure footing; second, we will try to move the discussion forward, by 
examining more closely the idea of physical contiguity that is central to R&L’s argument, 
and showing that the idea cannot bear the burden R&L place upon it. As this reply is 
necessarily brief, we encourage readers interested in a more detailed treatment of the subject 
to refer to our recent work on IE (Collins and Evans, 2015; Collins et al., 2015; Collins, 
2016), as well as the paper by Reyes-Galindo and Duarte (2015) that provides an additional 
response to Goddiksen (2014). These are all now available in print or electronic formats, and 
are referenced in the bibliography. 
Ribeiro’s reverse conceptual trajectory 
Much of what R&L argue has a reverse conceptual trajectory, attempting to restore the status 
of old ideas. Ribeiro completed his PhD under the supervision of Collins and Evans, and 
during this time co-authored two papers with members of the Cardiff group, ( Collins et al, 
2006, Ribeiro and Collins, 2007). Ribeiro later arranged to spend a year at Berkeley, working 
with Hubert Dreyfus, and developing a wider philosophical perspective on expertise. Dreyfus 
is a leading expert on the philosophy of Heidegger, he has published a very well known ‘five-
stage’ theory of expertise (with his brother, Stuart Dreyfus), and, he is the author of a 
pioneering critique of the claims of artificial intelligence (Dreyfus, 1972). Unsurprisingly, the 
phenomenology of Dreyfus plays an important role in R&L’s critique, which reproduces 
much of the long-running disagreement between Collins and Dreyfus over how individuals 
become experts. For Collins, the individual is essentially social and becomes an expert 
through socialization; for Dreyfus, the individual is essentially embodied and becomes an 
expert through practice. The importance of this difference is not always apparent, however, 
since socialization seems to depend on embodiment. Indeed, though he and Dreyfus have had 
many friendly meetings and discussions over the years the significance of the difference 
between their world views  became fully clear to Collins only in August 2015, when Dreyfus 
and he presented successive keynote addresses at a conference in Greece (the latter became 
Collins, 2016). As Dreyfus made plain at that meeting, and as R&L acknowledge, a central 
source for his phenomenological work is Todes’s (2001) Body and World, which was 
originally written as a PhD thesis in the 1960s. Todes is solely concerned with the role of our 
bodies in our experience of the world and thus writes in the introduction of that work:  
The reader is forewarned that the analyses presented in this study are not of our normal 
experience in its full complexity. ... Thus, for example, for the purposes of this study of 
the human body as the material subject of the world, our experience is simplified by 
disregarding our experience of other human beings.’ (Todes, 2001: 1, italics in original). 
For a sociologist, such a reductive and asocial approach ignores all the by now standard 
social constructionist accounts of how meanings are made in and through social interactions. 
Of course, these ideas were unavailable to Todes or to the other important figures in 
phenomenology who influenced Dreyfus, such as Merleau-Ponty and Heidigger.1 They are, 
however, available to R&L, who appear to choose not to use them. Instead, R&L restate the 
determinedly individualistic position against which Collins was reacting when he developed a 
sociology-of-knowledge-based critique of artificial intelligence in the 1980s and 90s. 
Why does this matter? Perhaps the easiest way to see the importance of socializing expertise, 
and to avoid the limitations that over-emphasis on embodiment brings, is to foreground the 
fundamental problems that the notion of IE resolves, always asking how we would resolve 
them without it. To give one example, consider the division of labour in technical specialties 
discussed in Collins (2011), and the kinds of knowledge STS fieldworkers can have of these 
practices. As we argue below, IE provides a much richer and more consistent account of the 
ways in which this expertise is shared than accounts that rely on embodied experience and an 
under-theorized capacity to extrapolate. This is why, among other things, the criminologist 
can understand crime without having to steal or murder (Collins and Evans, 2015).  
Collective and individual embodiment 
This failure to deal adequately with the different ways that language and practice combine at 
the collective and at the individual levels is the main weakness in R&L’s critique. The social 
dimension of human experience, which includes language, is central to the idea of IE. At the 
collective level, a form of life has to be a combination of language and practice – as is 
explained in Collins (2011), there can be no tennis language without tennis players. But, this 
relationship of language and practice at the collective level does not imply that to understand 
tennis one has to be a tennis player, any more than it implies that to understand what a chair 
is one has to be able to sit on one (Collins,1996a, 2016; Collins and Evans, 2015). At the 
collective level, there can be no tennis without tennis practice and no chairs without sitting, 
but the situation must change at the individual level, or someone who could not sit would not 
know what a chair was. The distinction between the collective and individual levels may be 
wrong, but, given the central role this distinction plays in the concept of IE, it is surprising 
that R&L ignore it.  
In fact, recognizing the difference between the individual and the collective would lead R&L 
to draw a very different conclusion from one of their arguments against IE. Consider their 
reference to the case of Madeleine, and its relevance for the minimal embodiment thesis. 
Here, R&L had the opportunity to move the debate forward, because the case has been used 
in two different ways: to show that IE was what allowed Madeleine to become fluent, in spite 
of her disabilities; and to argue for the minimal embodiment thesis. The two uses are 
somewhat tangled and, inter alia, R&L’s arguments go some way to disentangling them. 
The minimal embodiment thesis goes like this: If it is the case that an individual can 
understand a collective practice from language alone, then an individual can understand 
practice without possessing any more in the way of a body than that required to process 
speech. Note that this thesis does not apply at the species level, and Collins argues elsewhere 
(1996b) that a disembodied species could not develop human-like culture. Note also that if 
one takes into account the ways certain kinds of physical prostheses have developed – 
consider the case of Stephen Hawking – it is arguable that an individual needs even less than 
the minimal body to understand speech and therefore practice – just a brain in vat supported 
by prostheses. But it does not matter if the minimal body thesis is true, insofar as the idea of 
IE is concerned, and R&L’s use of the case does a service by cutting through some earlier 
confusions. They write: 
Madeleine was a full[y]-fledged social being. Her blindness and disability did not 
impede her from playing roles as a daughter, a friend and perhaps as a sister or an 
aunt. She had enough of a body to feel loved, hated, sad or happy. She also 
participated, in one way or another, when being cared for, fed, washed and carried 
around. Moreover, we can infer that she was able to ask for food or water when she 
was hungry and thirsty, to talk about the food and juice people offered her, to 
appreciate those who were kind and to thank them, to complain about her bad days, to 
participate in other people’s lives by listening and giving her opinion, to request a 
doctor when feeling sick and so forth. In short, Madeleine knew ‘how to do things 
with words’. (R&L, 2016: 15) 
For the sake of argument, let us accept this description of Madeleine and agree that 
Madeleine has much more than a minimal body, rendering Collins and Evans’s use of her 
case in support of the minimal embodiment hypothesis flawed. In addition, let us accept that, 
in Selinger’s terms, she can extrapolate from those parts of her body that she did possess to 
abilities that she could not actually experience. If we do this, we understand, in the terms 
used by R&L, that one can learn to ‘do things with words’ even if one’s practical engagement 
with the world is severely limited. 
We can ask, then, what is stopping Madeleine from extrapolating from these experiences to a 
full understanding of other aspects of social life? As R&L say, Madeline is a ‘fully-fledged 
social being’ – there is no suggestion in their account of Madeleine, or in any other 
description of the case, that Madeleine’s discourse is restricted to utilitarian requests related 
to her own bodily state. So, where does her understanding of ‘other people’s lives’, and the 
legitimacy of her opinions, come from, if not from her conversations? This reasoning is 
perfectly consistent with the idea of IE, which provides a way of linking the individual to the 
collective. The case is impossible to explain if Madeleine’s linguistic abilities are restricted to 
what she has experienced directly. Ironically, in their determination to show that the minimal 
embodiment thesis is not supported by the case of Madeleine, R&L make the wider case for 
us – an embodied agent that is also a social agent can understand things through language that 
their body prevents them experiencing directly. What, then, is to stop Madeleine learning to 
understand, say, gravitational wave physics, if she had enough conversations with 
gravitational wave physicists?  
The Imitation Game 
Another example of R&L’s determination to show that everything about the idea of IE is 
wrong, that ends up undermining their own argument, appears in their discussion of the 
Imitation Game, which is a research method developed specifically to investigate IE’s reach 
and significance. We focus on R&L’s argument that ‘creating a contrast’ means that the 
Imitation Game more accurately measures what ‘judges’ do, rather than what ‘pretenders’ do. 
As with the minimal embodiment hypothesis, there are some useful insights in R&L’s 
analysis, but these are more consistent with the idea of IE than its refutation. 
The Imitation Game is a quasi-Turing Test in which a ‘judge’ from the relevant community, 
someone who possesses the necessary ‘target expertise’, sends questions to another member 
of the same social group (the ‘non-pretender’) and a member of a different social group (the 
‘pretender’). The non-pretender answers naturally, while the pretender answers as if he or she 
were a member of the target social group. The initial hypothesis was that, if the pretender 
group has many social interactions with the non-pretender group, it would be able to develop 
IE in the target domain and so provide more plausible answers. In such a case, it would 
become more difficult for the judge reliably to distinguish between the two sets of answers 
than in cases in which the pretender has little social contact and therefore no IE in the target 
expertise. 
R&L use the examples of the ‘colour-blind’ pretending to be ‘colour-perceivers’ (and vice 
versa) and ‘pitch-perceivers’ pretending to be ‘pitch-blind’ (and vice versa), which were 
drawn from a paper on which both Collins and Ribeiro were authors (Collins et al., 2006). 
R&L’s criticism of this work makes two claims: IE does not explain the results, but the 
embodied experience of participants does. Neither of these arguments are persuasive. In the 
first of these arguments, R&L argue that the early analysis of the Imitation Game data is 
flawed because it focuses solely on the knowledge of pretenders, and hence explains results 
purely in terms of what pretenders know or don’t know. As we have made clear at many 
conferences, we are now working with a far more sophisticated understanding of the 
Imitation Game. We now see that all three participants – the pretender, the judge, and the 
non-pretender – contribute to the outcome (see Collins et al., forthcoming). We do not, then, 
disagree with R&L that the judge matters; the disagreement is over what this means for 
interpreting the data and for the idea of IE. 
The main contention of R&L is that successful judging involves creating a contrast between 
the judge’s group and the one from which the pretenders are drawn. One way to do this well 
is for the judge to alternate between the two social groups and hence to identify the points at 
which one can be distinguished one from the other. Thus, R&L write: 
because colour-blind people socialize with colour-perceiving people, they already 
know that the latter have the erroneous idea that colour-blind people ‘read’ traffic 
lights based on the location of the lights – top, middle or bottom. Because of this, 
colour-blind people know that this is a discriminating question [that can be] posed in 
order to discern who is pretending to be colour-blind. In contrast, when an individual 
is not subjected to alternation, the difficulty in realizing the taken-for-granted 
practices of one single form of life translates into a difficulty in articulating such 
experience. (R&L, 2016: 18) 
Here, R&L conflate two separate issues: IE and reflexivity. In the case of the colour-blind 
judges who know what colour-perceivers think about the experiences of the colour blind, 
R&L are describing IE; it is knowledge of the form of life inhabited by colour perceivers 
acquired through social interaction with them. The parallel with Madeleine’s ability to 
understand the lives of others and hold opinions about them based on her social interactions 
with them seems obvious and yet, once again, R&L do not seem to notice that the behaviour 
they describe depends on the very ability they want to deny! How else would the judge put 
themself in the position of ‘knowing’ what the pretender group ‘knows’, given that, by 
definition, they cannot have experienced it directly for themselves? 
The problem of reflexivity, which might explain why judges from dominant or hegemonic 
groups struggle to come up with discrimination questions, is quite different. The problem 
might be due to the judges’ inability to alternate – and hence due to an absence of IE – caused 
by limited or asymmetric social relations, through which judges learn little or nothing about 
the other community. In such circumstances, judges might well struggle to create a contrast, 
as R&L suggest. Even so, the pretender still has to provide plausible answers, based on their 
understanding of the dominant culture for the chance outcome we observe in the data to 
occur. Again, nothing that R&L say provides a better explanation for this than the argument 
that the colour blind, or any of the other populations in which we observe a similar pattern 
(see Collins and Evans, 2014), have developed IE about the target culture by virtue of their 
repeated social interactions with its members. 
Had R&L approached the problem differently, there is a question here that could be pursued 
more fully: How does the balance between IE and social interaction vary across topics? Three 
possibilities spring to mind. First, we can imagine Imitation Games in which judges could 
succeed without needing to pose questions that draw on the in-depth social interactions that 
IE requires. Imagine that the Game was being used to distinguish native English speakers 
from unilingual Chinese speakers: The judge would not need to speak Chinese to recognize 
that the pretenders were failing to speak English. Some Imitation Games concerned with 
social issues work that way, suggesting that some Imitation Game judges’ ability to 
discriminate ments can be explained without much reference to IE. Second, there are the 
cases, like that of the colour blind, where judges have some understanding of pretenders’ 
form of life in virtue of their social interactions. Here, judges are able to use this 
understanding – based as we see it on IE – to alternate and identify points of contrast. Finally, 
there are cases, illustrated by the colour perceivers in the studies that R&L cite, in which 
there is a high degree of social interaction but little or no ability of the part of the judges to 
alternate; pretenders, however, would still need IE to provide plausible answers. Thinking 
through these dynamics would lead to a richer set of a priori predictions but it does not seem 
to challenge the idea of IE in any significant way. 
Confusion of ‘necessary’ and ‘efficient’  
The previous two sections dealt with those elements of R&Ls critique that could be seen as 
offering some useful clarification or extension of the published material on IE. There is, 
however, a key element of R&L’s argument – the division of IE into different levels based on 
the type of immersion – that we cannot approach in the same way. This is a shame, as it 
would be very useful to develop a classification of types of IE, as it is obvious that successful 
socialization cannot be a flip-flop process and there must be some in-between stages that fill 
the gap between the halting utterances of the novice and the fluent discourse of the expert. 
Unfortunately, R&L’s attempt to create levels of IE is fatally flawed in both conception and 
implementation. What they say is the ‘level’ of IE depends on the ‘type of immersion’ 
experienced by the learner. The idea of types of immersion, which was developed by Ribeiro 
(2013a), has three central classes: ‘linguistic socialization’ (alone), ‘physical contiguity’ 
(linguistic plus visual) and ‘physical immersion’ (doing the practice). On our account, the 
first two could give rise to IE, with the second being more efficient than the first, whilst only 
the third could give rise to both contributory expertise and IE. In principle, however, 
according to the way that IE was initially defined, all three types of immersion could lead to 
exactly the same level of IE (i.e., full fluency in the practice language). In contrast, R&L 
make the very different claim that ‘the type of immersion individuals undergo within a 
practice defines their abilities and understanding with respect to that particular practice’. 
That, of course, is exactly contrary to the quintessence of the idea of IE, the surprising and 
counter-common-sensical feature of which is precisely a mismatch between the level of 
immersion and the expected level of expertise (one can gain practical understanding with no 
practical experience). This makes their proposal to ‘… adopt the terms pure-IE, special-IE 
and typical-IE here in order to link IE to how it is developed’ (R&L, 2016: 10) at best 
tendentious, as the definitions are incompatible at the outset with the ideas they are 
criticizing. 
There are, in fact, two problems with the classification. The other is that the data presented to 
support it – and particularly to support its use as refutation of the bolder conjectures made to 
drive IE research – seem very thin and do not answer the crucial question. For example, 
although their Tables 1 and 2 contain many examples and quotes that appear to fit R&L’s 
typology, it is hardly surprising to find that trainees found a site visit in which they were able 
to see their future place of work helpful (R&L, 2016: 8, 11). Unfortunately, this tells us next 
to nothing about the extent to which a longer, more intensive immersion in linguistic 
discourse could have achieved similar results if the aim was purely to learn the language and 
not master the practice to which it refers. All we can conclude from R&L’s tables is that 
those elements of the training programmes that relied on more restricted types of immersion 
did not result in participants gaining high-levels of IE. But, as they were not designed to do 
this, it is hard to know what – if anything – should follow. The empirical evidence appears to 
miss the philosophical point. It is no surprise that exposure to practice is an efficient way of 
learning a language, but the question is whether such exposure is the only way to learn a 
language. 
In fact, a classification of this sort is of no help for anything but the most trivial of questions. 
Imagine that I am a sociologist wanting to acquire IE in a new technical domain. Where 
should I go to acquire it? Obviously, I am going to go where the experts are and the experts 
will be practising their crafts, so I am virtually certain to experience some of what R&L 
would call ‘physical contiguity’ regardless of whether or not physical contiguity is strictly 
necessary to the acquisition of IE; one cannot imagine one doing one’s fieldwork any other 
way. And if actively working with the participants were an option (as it was in the case of 
Collins and Harrison, 1975), one would be a fool not take advantage, as it would increase 
one’s immersion in the discourse of the group one was studying. A picture is worth a 
thousand words, but the helpfulness of seeing things does not make seeing necessary. After 
all, the corollary is that a thousand words is worth a picture, and it is worth noting in this 
context that, in his early work, Collins (1974) showed that, where laser scientists did feel 
themselves bound to allow their competitors to see their working lasers, they were very 
careful about what they said! Without additional kinds of argument, R&L’s classification of 
IE cannot be taken as more than a description of approaches to the efficient acquisition of IE 
by both fieldworkers and novices. It is no surprise that translators felt their acquisition of IE 
was aided by their being able to get themselves close to the practice – it probably did – but 
that doesn’t make closeness to practice necessary. 
R&L seem to misunderstand the philosophical nature of the idea of IE. As we explain in 
various places, the ‘Strong Interactional Hypothesis’ (SIH) is a Popper-type ‘bold 
conjecture’, meant to push forward the frontiers of research (Collins and Evans, 2015). Like a 
thought experiment, a bold conjecture does not have to be directly empirically grounded – we 
don’t need cats in boxes, with flasks of cyanide and radioactive isotopes, to see the point of 
the Schrodinger’s Cat thought experiment, or for it to have empirical consequences. It 
certainly is hard to prove the existence of what R&L call ‘pure IE’, IE that has been gained 
through linguistic socialization alone, without any physical contiguity. As we have recently 
written: ‘It is hard to prove or disprove the SIH because one must show that persons failing 
tests did have the opportunity to gain maximal interactional expertise, while it also has to be 
shown that persons passing the test had gained their understanding purely from linguistic 
sources. Both conditions are rare, hard to fulfil and very easy to forget’ (Collins and Evans, 
2015: 116). 
That the idea has, nevertheless, empirical consequences and great explanatory power is what 
is shown in the various papers. But the difficulty of proving it could easily leave us open to 
the charge made by R&L (2016: 11): ‘There is no empirical evidence – not a single example 
– of pure-IE’. To establish this claim, they list what they say is all the fieldwork support there 
is for the notion. Unfortunately, they do not mention the most relevant experiment, which is 
reported in a paper they cite (Collins and Evans, 2014): the experiment with the blind.  
Though it is extraordinarily difficult to bring empirical evidence to bear on the SIH, the 
fieldwork on the blind comes close. Gaining IE nearly always involves physical contiguity 
but the blind, if faced by the right questions, cannot have relevant physical contiguity. The 
field study on the blind is particularly relevant because it was set up to disprove the SIH. Not 
believing it could be more than a guide for action, we set out to show where it broke down. 
The surprise was that even under these extreme circumstances, it did not break down. Here is 
a question from a sighted judge and the answer provided by a blind person pretending to be 
sighted: 
Q: How accurately would you say a human can judge the flight of a tennis-ball? I 
mean, would you say they could tell the difference between touch[ing] the line and 1 
mm out 2 mm out 1 cm out, 2 cm out, or what, and what would it depend on? 
A: I think often a tennis player is not in a position to judge accurately as they are not 
usually parallel with the line. I think that if you set up a test for a line judge with two 
balls one which landed on the line and one which landed 1 mm away from the line, I 
don’t think they could tell the difference. If you think how small 1 mm is then it 
would be so hard for them to judge. 
Let us point out that these experiments were done with participants who were not 
congenitally blind but who became registered blind in the early years of their lives. Judges 
were informed of this and were instructed to ask questions that pertained to adult life only. In 
this case, the participant would not have encountered tennis in their very early sighted life 
nor, given their age and nationality, would they have encountered millimetres. This may not 
be a perfect experiment, but it gets close.  
One can see why experiments on those with unusual physical and perceptual abilities are 
particularly salient when it comes to what R&L call ‘pure IE’; everyone who is able will be 
getting as much physical contiguity as they can while they are acquiring IE, so cases where 
physical contiguity is necessarily limited are particularly interesting. What the experiment 
with the blind shows is that whilst physical contiguity may be efficacious for acquiring IE, it 
is not necessary. 
Is there a positive direction in which R&L’s analysis can take us? 
Ribeiro’s idea of levels of immersion applies well to his superb fieldwork on the training of 
novice mining operatives (see e.g., Ribeiro, 2013b), or, generalizing, could apply to the 
pedagogy of practice. But this typology of immersion does not give rise to a philosophical 
critique or a classification of IE, any more than an analysis of educational practices in schools 
would give rise to an epistemological critique or a classification of types of knowledge. 
Seen as an exploration of how best to transfer knowledge, one very interesting question that 
follows from Ribeiro’s classification of types of immersion is to ask what is meant by 
‘physical contiguity’.2 Ribeiro has observed that though Collins has passed an Imitation 
Game test in the esoteric domain of gravitational wave physics, he acquired his IE in 
conditions of high physical contiguity. But what does high physical contiguity mean?  
The question was partly motivated by a coincidence – on the same day that Collins and Evans 
received their copy of R&L’s critique, Collins was told an interesting story about Francis 
Halzen, the instigator and Director of the IceCube project. IceCube is a cubic kilometre of ice 
at the South Pole instrumented to detect neutrinos; it is a $270M project. Collins was told that 
Halzen had never visited the South Pole and the relevance of this to the notion of physical 
contiguity struck him. Being acquainted with Halzen through previous email exchanges 
regarding his book, Gravity’s Shadow, and its account of ‘big science’ which Halzen had 
found useful, arranged a telephone conversation. For Collins, the conversation was initially 
disappointing, since Halzen explained that, though he had not visited the South Pole, he had 
been present when the components of the apparatus were being built near his home 
university, the University of Wisconsin. Most of the work had been done at the Physical 
Sciences Laboratory, 20 miles south of Madison, and Halzen had visited it frequently. Collins 
and Halzen agreed that the latter’s not visiting the South Pole was no more remarkable than if 
a scientist had built a seismic detector to be placed on the Moon and had not travelled to the 
Moon with the astronauts to witness its installation. Note, however, that we have already 
accepted as a matter of course that Moon scientists do not have to visit the Moon and so we 
have at least begun to open up a question about the necessity of physical contiguity. But 
Halzen also stressed that it was a remarkable thing that he was a theoretician. The experiment 
was a matter of new kinds of apparatuses making new kinds of measurements, involving 
work for which he had no special skills. He made visits to the lab because he had to talk to 
the engineers, not because he needed be close to the apparatus itself.  
This is a useful anecdote but, perhaps, not decisive. But it raises the question of exactly what 
physical contiguity is and what it does. Consider, however, what one could learn from a visit 
to a gravitational wave detector site – they have many visitors on their outreach programs.  
If you visited such a site, you would see some concrete covers of roughly semi-circular cross-
section about 20 feet high, stretching for two-and-a-half miles in each of two directions at 
right angles, from a large central building and with smaller building at each end. Here and 
there would be doorways into the concrete covers, and if you entered you would find a tunnel 
filled with debris and long tubes four or five feet in diameter, encased in yellow fibrous 
insulation. If you went into the big building you would find meeting rooms, places to eat, 
workshops, and so on. You could look into the control room and see large screens on the wall 
showing all kinds of displays that you would not understand (Collins doesn’t understand most 
of them) and scientists sitting at consoles looking at the screens and adjusting things. If you 
were allowed into the heart of the machine, after donning overshoes and laser-proof glasses, 
you would see a hangar-like structure with the ends of the stainless steel tubes entering large 
domed structures with access ports bolted shut (see, e.g. Collins, 2004). You would see 
nothing of the meaning of laser-interferometric detection of gravitational waves.  It would not 
be dissimilar to what visitors learn about Higgs Bosons by looking at the beam tubes at 
CERN.  ~~Do such a site visits involve physical contiguity, and if so what does physical 
contiguity do?  
One thing site visits have done for Collins, as for Halzen, is to get him close to the people 
with whom he has needed to talk. It has also given him ‘street credibility’ which could help 
those conversations along. Whenever he has met a scientist, at a site, or at a remote 
conference, he has been able to say: when I was at Hanford I often crossed the bridge and sat 
down on the inside of the ‘L’ where it was completely quiet. Then I could watch the sun set 
over Rattlesnake Mountain; it was beautiful.’ Or he could say, ‘have you noticed that in the 
conference room the backs of the chairs all have sticky labels on them saying “Super-
Conducting Super-Collider”?’ All that is establishing the conditions for easy social 
interaction but it does not seem like a necessary condition for the development of 
gravitational wave IE, nor would its content be technical – something that would directly help 
one pass an Imitation Game test (just look at the questions and answers in articles by Collins 
and Evans (2007: 105) or Giles (2006)).  
But there is a case described by Collins (2004: 773) where it seems that physical contiguity 
was directly important, and it is a significant case that helped to establish the idea of IE. 
Collins visited the relatively small (100 meter arms) interferometer known as TAMA in 
Tokyo. His host explained to him that TAMA was suffering from unexplained noise and that 
many people thought this was because scattered light was reflecting off the inside walls of the 
beam tube and interfering with the light-sensitive feedback loops. But his host also said that it 
was not true and this could be demonstrated because the beam tube could be knocked or 
shaken without affecting the output trace. Collins cannot remember whether or not he tried 
the experiment himself. Subsequently, at a conference in Kyoto, Gary Sanders, the project 
manager of LIGO, told Collins that TAMA suffered from stray light scattered from the inside 
of the beam tubes. Collins, however, was able to convince Sanders that this was not true, by 
referring to the shaking of the beam tube. This incident reinforced the idea of IE, because 
Collins, a non-physicist, had been able to convey credible physical understanding to Sanders. 
The point is that it doesn’t matter whether Collins actually shook the tube or merely heard an 
account of the experiment. What is sure is that Sanders did not shake the beam tube but 
changed his physical understanding just from hearing about it. Sanders may well have never 
visited TAMA. Both Collins and Sanders only had to describe the experiment for it to be as 
though they had actually shaken the beam tube themselves and perhaps the same goes for the 
readers of this article: It may be that one element of IE is the countless visualisations of this 
kind that verbal interactions make possible. So, the question is: In terms of this specific 
example, who has physical contiguity and what is physical contiguity doing? What is there 
that you could not learn from this description of beam-tube shaking, if you had never seen a 
beam-tube? What more could you understand about it by visiting one of the LIGO sites, and 
in terms of this piece of physical understanding, would a visit be an increase in physical 
contiguity or not?  
Thus it is unclear, contrary to the claim of R&L, that Collins had lots of physical contiguity 
with the practice of gravitational wave physics. In fact, it is not so clear what the claim 
means. Collins certainly visited all the sites and wrote descriptions of visits to Louisiana, the 
Australian bush, the corner of a field in Hanover, and so on, but the nearest thing to physical 
contiguity with the heart of the technology that he had was the encounter in Tokyo. As for the 
rest, he might just as well have been a tourist, just like visitors touring a gravitational wave 
detector site. The aspects of these visits that were different from those pertaining to tourist 
were intimate and, to some extent, confrontational, conversations, commensality and so forth.  
We do not think the above passage provides answers to the question of what physical 
contiguity comprises but instead raises interesting questions about the very concept itself. It 
turns out that when we look closely at the concept, we do not know what it means. This is 
usually an indicator that there are interesting things to be worked out. We certainly hope that 
R&L will try to take the matter forward rather than back. 
The fundamental questions 
To repeat, perhaps the easiest way to avoid being sucked back into the ideas of the 
importance of embodiment that do not benefit from the more recent ‘socialization’ of the 
notion of knowledge is, once more, to keep in mind the fundamental problems that the notion 
of IE resolves and always to ask how we would resolve them without it. Consider the esoteric 
expertises and controversies that are the mainstay of STS research. If we are to have 
specialists who can co-ordinate their actions or criticize the work of competitors without 
engaging in each other’s physical practices – and that is what having specialists implies – 
how can they do it other than by understanding each others’ form of life though the medium 
of language – interactional expertise? It would be good if every specialist could spend time at 
the home laboratory of every other specialist, so as to speak with them in conditions of high 
physical contiguity but this is logistically impossible. Fortunately, just as Francis Halzen does 
not have to visit Antarctica, and a Moon scientist does not need to step on the Moon, a 
cooperating community can use the thousands upon thousands of words spoken at common 
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1
 A reviewer of Todes’s book writes: 
the book bypasses entirely the fundamental human experiences of sociality and 
language – instead one could read Todes thinking that humans are hermits working 
out the meaning and efficacy of their participation in the world. The kinds of insights 
later hermeneuts and constructionists offer – that the categories we use to make our 
experience know-able and habit-able are accessible human and cultural constructions 
– were not available to Todes. (Strong, 2004: 521) 
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